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COMMUNICATIONS LAW
THE FCC'S CABLE TELEVISION REGULATIONSROUND FOUR
MICHAEL BOTEIN

N
2, 1972 the Federal Communications Commission
O
a issued the Cable Television Repol·t and Order,l which established a
FEBRUARY

new set of ground rules for cable television.!! The Report and Order affects
such controversial areas as the use of broadcast television signals, access
to cable television, and intergovernmental regulatory relationships. For .1
change, practically all parties professed happiness with - or at least
acquiesence in - the regulations; the Chairman of the National Cable
Television Association even termed them "the watershed" of cable development.3 The rules theoretically represent a thaw in the "freeze" on cable
television, but realistically are only a nominal change from the statlls quo.
I
Up, DOWN AND AROUND THE HILL: BACKGROUND TO THE
REpORT AND ORDER

Throughout its twenty-year existence, cable television has lived in a
chaotic regulatory environment. Local franchising has been uncoordinatReceived for publication March 1, 1972.
Michael Botein is an Assistant Professor at the School of Law, University of
Georgia.
1. 37 Fed. Reg.3251 (19i2) [hereinafter cited as Cable Tele\'ision Report and Order).
2. Cable television is also known as community antenna television (CATV). a name
reflecting its original function of providing television signals to areas whidl could not receive over-the-air broadcasts. As the medium has changed, howevcr, so has its name;
CATV is no longer appropriate or even accurate, since tllere is little usc of antennas-and
even less community-in cable television today.
A cable television system has four main components. First, it either reeeh'es television signals by an antenna or microwave relay, or originates them at somc local point.
Second, the signals are sent to a "headend," where they arc amplified and where their frequency is sometimes changed. Third, the signals arc sent out over trunk and feeder lines
throughout the cable system's area. Finally, indhidual drop lines caIT)o the signals from
the trunk or feeder lines into each subscriber's home. For a simple but accurate descrip·
tion of the process, see Knox, Cable Telet';sion, SCIEllo'TI,FIC AM., Oct. 19i1, at 22.
3. BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 19i2, at 17. Though the National Association of Broadcasters apparently acqUiesced in the rules (as the Broadcastcr-Cable Agreemcnt, see notes
23-24 infra and accompanying tcxt, presumably forced it to do), certain otber lc)c\'ision
interests were less than ecstatic. I d. at 44.
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ed, uninformed, and at times unscrupulous;4 the handful of states in the
area have acted with confusion and delay;" and the Federal Communica·
tions Commission has assumed a veritable Kama Sutra of regulatory
positions, remaining consistent only in its unwavering freeze on cable
development. 6
The real bone of contention on the federal level has been and
remains cable's use of "distant signals" - signals of stations which
normally cannot be received in a cable system's community.1 Cable
operators see importation of distant signals as necessary to attract subscribers. Broadcasters fear, however, that cable's use of distant signals
will lure away a portion of their usually captive audience, thus decreasing
their advertising revenues.s Moreover, program owners have opposed
cable's use of both distant and local signals ever since Fortnightly Corp.
v. United A1·tists Television, Inc. 9 held that cable's use of broadcast
signals did not constitute copyright infringement. Congress obviously has
the authority to resolve the copyright and distant signal issues, but the
balance of political power has prevented it from acting. 10 In fact, the
cable controversy has kept the long overdue copyright reform act locked
up in committee since 1965.11
When first presented with the problem of cable in 1959, the Com·
mission responded by largely ignoring it. It simply refused to take
4. See Botein, CATY Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 816,
817·21 (1970). To date, few detailed analyses of the local regulatory process have been
undertaken, presumably because of the sheer number of separate local authorities. A
recent empirical study of the New Jersey situation, however, concluded that "the per·
formance of local government in regulating CATV can only be termed a failure." TilE
CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC IssUES, CROSSED 'VUU:S-CADLE TELEVISION IN NEW JERSE\'
45 et seq., 65 (1971). The situation in New York State appears to be little different. Sre
W. K. JONES, REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION DY THE STATE OF NEW YORK 127·69 (N.Y.
Pub. Servo Comm'n 1970).
Corruption in local franchising has surfaced recently in several states, heightening
the regulatory ch::.os. See, e.g., ~.Y. Times, April 21, 1971, at 95, col. 2: March 28, 1971,
at 31, col. 1: March 25, 1971, at 78, col. 6. Furthermore, in October, 1971, Irving Kahn, the
czar of the cable industry, was convicted of bribing Johnstown, Pennsylvania officials.
BROADCAffiNG, Oct. 25,1971, at 26.
5. See Botein, supra note 4, at 821·24. For a description of the Connecticut and
Nevada experiences in regulating cable, see M. MrrCHELL, STATE RECULATION OF CADLE
TELEVISION 4·43 (Rand Corp. 1971).
6. See text accompanying notes 7·25 infra.
7. Actually, the new rules have developed several different definitions for both
distant and local signals. See text accompanying notes 28·28 infra.
8. Realistically, this fear does not seem to have much solid factual support. See tcxt
accompanying notes 66·67 infra.
9. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The cable system in Fortnightly, however, carried local
signals. Therefore, the result arguably might ue different where a system imports distant
signals. But see Columbia Broadcasting System v. Teleprompter, Inc., __ F. Supp. __
(S.D.N.Y.1972).
10. An entire succession of cable copyright bills has been introduced, only to die slow
deaths in committee. Botein, supra note 4, at 839·42.
11. See H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
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jurisdiction over cable television on the grounds that it lackcd statutory
authority and that cable posed no threat to broadcast tclcvision.l!l By
1966 cable's dramatic growth had changed the latter proposition, however, and the Commission reconsidered the former in light of its broadcast clients' anguished cries. As a result, in its Second Report and Order13
the Commission slapped a virtual freeze on cable; it prohibitcd systems
in the major, i.e., the one hundred largest, television markets from
carrying distant signals unless they underwent a lengthy evidentiary
proceeding14 - only one of which was ever completed. IIi
This tactic, however, soon began to look somewhat dilatory. In 1968
the Commission suspended the regulations and proposed rcquiring thal
cable systems secure the "retransmission consent" of stations broadcasting
distant signals.16 Although this requirement should have cqualized broadcaster-cable competition, the cable operators somehow ncver were able to
get consent.17 Then in 1970 the Commission proposed its chickcn-in-cverypot "public dividend plan" as another alternativc. This dclightful but
unworkable proposal would have allowed major market cable systems to
import four distant signals in return for substituting local statiom'
commercials on those signals and donating five percent of their gross
receipts to public television.1s
By the summer of 1971, the Commission had decided that neither
12. See Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959). The Commission was correct in
deciding that cable was of little danger to broadcast tele\'ision, since at that time then'
were only about 600 cable systems with a total of 3 quancr of a million sub'lCribc1'l.
Knox, supra note 2, at 24.
13. 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). Actually, the Commission bad claimed jurisdiction o\er
cable previously in its First Report and Order. 38 F.C.C. 683 (196:;). but had promulgated rules only for systems which imported signals by microwave rclays.
14. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1971) put the burden on major markct cablc S}5tcms to show
that importation of distant signals would "be consistcnt witll thc public intcrest, and
specifically the establishment and healthy maintenancc of tclcvision bro3dcast sen'ice
in the area." In addition, a combination of two othcr rules, 47 C.F.R. ~~ 74.110;;, i4.l10~
(1971), resulted in the imposition of a virtually idcntical rlquircmcnt for smaller market
cable systems whenever an objection was leveled at a systcm's use o[ distant signals. It
has been noted that "in practice there are no lack of objcctors." ~Iemorandum Opinion
and Order, 6 F.C.C.2d 309, 339 (1967) (Locvingcr. Comm'r. dissenting).
15. Midwest Television, Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 478 (1968).
16. Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of lnquil)'. 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (19GS}.
The Commission stated that pending the conclusion of the proposed rulc making, whicll
turned out to be rather distant, it would process only applications consistent witll the
proposed rules. [d. at 437-38.
17. The one cable system to experiment with rctran£IIlission consent found that
most stations and program owners denied permission for a whole \':lricty of rcarons.
Cable Television Report and Order at 3255·56.
18. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,045 (1970).
In its one test, the commercial substitution plan provcd marginally workable. Different
parties' estimates as to the cost of the nccessary switclling equipmcnt needed for the
substitution of local commercials. howevcr. varied greatly. Cablc Telcvision Repon and
Order at 3256.
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the retransmission consent nor the public dividend plan was feasible and
thus set to work on still another set of proposals. 10 Because of political
and time pressures, the Commission took the somewhat unusual step of
sending a "letter of intent" to Congress.20 The Commission therein
proposed allowing cable systems to import enough distant signals to offer
cable viewers "minimum service"-three network and three independent
signals in the fifty largest markets, three network and two independent
signals in the fifty next largest markets, and three network signals and
one independent signal in the smaller markets. In addition, cable systems
in the major markets would have been permitted to carry two additional
"wild card" distant signals. If distant signals were used to provide
minimum service, however, the number of additional wild card signals
would decrease proportionately.21 For example, a New York City cable
system would not have needed distant signals to provide minimum service
and instead could have used its wild cards to bring in two additional
independent signals.
This new proposal thus put the Commission in a rather anomalous
position; by the end of 1971 it had one suspended set of rules, two
discredited sets of proposed rules, and one informally announced pro·
posa1.22 As might be expected, the impasse ultimately was resolved behind
closed doors. Throughout 1971, Commission Chairman Burch and Office
of Telecommunications Policy Director Whitehead played musical chairs
in mediating negotiations between broadcasting and cable representa·
tives. 23 On November II, 1971, they emerged with an accord - the
"Broadcaster-Cable Agreement".24 The Broadcaster·Cable Agreement
19. In two almost identical speeches, Commission Chairman Burch made it clear
that both of the plans had been scrapped. Hearings Be/ore the Communications Sub·
comm. 0/ the Senate Commerce Comm., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 et seq. (Testimony of
Chairman Dean Burch); Hearings be/ore the Communications SlIbcomm. 0/ the Housc
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Scss. at 17 et seq. (Testimony
of Chairman Dean Burch).
20. Letter from Chairman Dean Burch to the Communications Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Aug. 5,1971,22 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 1759 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Letter of Intent].
21. Id. at 1764·65.
22. Because of this confused state of affairs, the Commission was not able to deliver
upon the promise of expedited action which it had made in June, 1970. At that time it
had warned parties "not [to] follow what has all too often been the practice in these
complex rule making proceedings-doing nothing for several months and then seeking
extensions when the third month deadline looms upon them." Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,045, 11,049 (1970).
23. BROADCASTING, Nov. 15, 1971, at 16. Although the final agreement appeared to be
mainly the product of Director Whitehead's efforts, id., the Commission noted just that
"[t]he Office of Telecommunications Policy provided valuable assistance in the negotla.
tions that led to this agreement." Cable Television Report and Order at 3260.
Predictably enough, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson condemned the "secret bargain.
ing sessions" which led to the accord. Cable Television Report and Order, 24 P&:F RADIO
REG. 2d 1589 (1972) Oohnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
24. Cable Television Report and Order at 3341 [hereinafter cited at Broadcaster·
Cable Agreement].
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purportedly authorized as many distant signals as the Letter of Intent,
but it also created "exclusivity" limitations as to the programs which
could be carried on a distant signal.2a Irrespective of this restrictive facet,
however, the Agreement proved the key to the distant signal dilemma
and opened the door to the Cable Television Report and Order.
II

Now You

SEE THEM) Now You DON'T: CABLE USE OF
BROADCAST SIGNALS

The Cable Television Report and Order is an amalgam of the Letter
of Intent and the Broadcaster-Cable Agreement. Realistically, it also
represents an attempt to lock the Agreement into law before the parties
could have second thoughts.26 As a result, the local signal provisions
follow the Letter of Intent and the distant signal provisions follow the
Agreement.
Local Signals.-Although everyone agrees that cable systems should
be required to carry local signals, there is no consensus as to which signal~
are "local." In 1966 the Commission initially defined a local signal as that
of any television station which placed a projected Grade B contour - a
theoretically receivable signal- over a cable system's community.:!i This
standard soon proved simplistic rather than simple, however, since quirks
of terrain often create a substantial difference between projected and
actual coverage. The new mandatory carriage rules therefore employ a
number of separate and often overlapping tests.
Even though the rules differ for major markets,28 smaller markets,2!l
25. For an analysis of the provisions in the agreement, see Botein, Cable TJ': if OlleDegree Thaw in the Freeze?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29,1971. at 1. col. 1.
26. By promulgating final rules without first issuing a notice of proposed rule making. the Commission probably was attempting to cement down tlle paCL Commissioners
Robert Lee and Richard Wiley apparently wanted to issue a notice of proposed rule
making but were voted down. BROADCASrING, January 31. 1972, at 8.
27. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101 (i) (1971). A television station's signal is measured by three
main standards of increasing coverage and decreasing signal quality: principal community contour. Grade A contour. and Grade B contour. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.683 (a)-73.685 (a)
(1972). Each contour varies in relation to the station's power. frequency. antenna height.
etc.
28. Thus the rules require major market cable systems to carry (1) stations within
whose specified zones they are located. (2) public television stations within whose Grade
B contours they are located, (3) commercial television translator. i.e., relay. stations with
one hundred or more watts. (4) stations licensed to their market. (5) significantI)' \"iewed
commercial stations. and (6) non-commercial translators with fh'c or more watts. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.61 (a). 76.63 ~a) (1972).
The Grade B contour standard for public television stations represents a partial
subsidy, since these stations' lack of mass appeal prevents them (rom meeting the \iewability test. The requirement that cable systems carry all stations licensed to their market
is largely redundant, since almost all stations within a market will meet either the specified zone or the viewability test. The rule will rationalize a few situations, howe\'er, in
which a station is theoretically licensed to one market but actually has most o{ its audio
ence in another.
The rules represent an improvement to the e.xtent that the)' do not mandate car-
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and areas outside of all markets,ao they have produced two important
new definitions of a local signal - "specified zone" and "significant
viewing." A specified zone is simply a thirty.five mile radius lrom a
reference point in each television station's community.IIl As a result, the
specified zone carriage requirement favors Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
stations, since UHF signals do not travel as far as Very High Frequency
(VHF) signals.a2
The second criterion, viewability, is framed in terms of share - a
station's percentage of the total audience viewing time - and net weekly
circulation - a station's percentage of the total viewing audience. In
order to have a right to cable carriage, a network station must have a
three percent share and a twenty.five percent net weekly circulation,
while an independent station needs two and five percent respectively.lIlI
In theory, this approach is eminently reasonable, since it measures a
station's real rather than projected coverage. In practice, however, it may
be nugatory. The percentages are so high that few stations will qualify
for carriage under the viewability test alone.84 In addition, special peti.
tions for carriage must include at least two "independent professional
riage, but rather only require it "on request of the relevant licensee or permittee." lei.
§ 76.61 (a). Though most cable systems will want to carry all local signals and most local
stations will want to be carried, the rules at least put the burden of triggering the carriage
requirement on the station.
29. 47 C.F.R § 76.59 (a) (1972). The carriage requirements applicable to cable systems
within smaller markets include all the standards for major market systems plus the re·
quirement that they carry commercial as well as non· commercial stations within whose
Grade B contour they are located.
30. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57 (a) (1972) requires cable $ystems outside of all television
markets to carry (1) stations within whose Grade B contours they arc located, (2) trans·
lators with one hundred or more watts, (3) public television stations within whose speci.
fied zones they are located, (4) significantly viewed commercial television stations, and (5)
any non-commercial translator with 5 or more watts power. The more lenient standard
for non-commercial television translators was added in the Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 13848, 13849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration Opinion).
The Grade B contour carriage requirement for cable systems located outside of nn}
market is probably a concession to the small but vocal group of Rocky Mountain broad·
casters who vigorously opposed the broadcaster-cable agreement. BROADCASTING, Nov. 22,
1971, at 40. In fact, the Commission specifically noted that for these broadcasters "an
effective zone must be much greater (e.g., Grade B contour) ..." and promised to give
"careful scrutiny" to their petitions for special relief. Cable Television Report and Order
at 3265.
31. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (f) (1972). 47 C.F.R. § 76.53 (1972) gives a fairly extensive list of
reference points in various communities. In the rare cases where no reference point is
specified, "the geographic coordinates of the main post office in the community shall be
used"-a standard no less rational than any other. ld.
32. The Commission acknowledged this result at least tacitly by noting that the
specified zone standard is intended to aid "less powerful stations" which arc usually
UHF_ Cable Tele.vision Report and Order at 3263.
S3. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (k) (1972).
24. For example, no Baltimore, Maryland stations would quaUfy under the view·
ability test for carriage by a District of Columbia cable system, even though several put
receivable signals over the District.
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audience surveys," which may make many applications prohibitively
expensive.35
Finally, the rules also limit signal carriage by a cable system localed
between two major markets, the so-called "footnote 69" situation.31l The
Commission essentially adopted its 1968 proposal3i that an o\'erlapping
market cable system carry only those stations within whose specified zone
it is localed.3s Although this formulation sometimes would restrict .1
system from carrying a signal receivable off the air, the viewability test
should counteract this bar and brin!? the rule into line with reality.
Distant Signals.-The distant signal regulations purport to follow
the Letter of Intent by providing for the same "minimum service" and
"wild cards."39 They are not as generous, however, as they appear.
First, under the new regulations a cable system must choo~e the
geographical source of its distant signals in accordance with the "leap.
frogging" rules. Thus, if a major market system desires signals from any
of the top twenty-five markets -:- as is likely to be common since the mo~t
attractive independent stations are in these markets - it must go to the
nearest of them. Furthermore, if a system can playa wild card Cor a third
independent liistant signal, it must look first to any UHF station witl1in
two hundred miles and, if no such station exists, then to either a VHF
station within two hundred miles or a UHF station anywhere.40 As a
result, cable operators must go further - and thus pay more - in order
35. 47 C.F.R. § 76.54 (1972). Moreover, "to minimize contrO\'ersy" in the initi:ll st'lgCS
of the new program, the rule provides that the Commission will not entertain special
petitions until a year after the effective date of the rules. The Commission recognized thl:
severity of these restrictions, but argued that "signals once permitted to be carried will
not be deleted ..."-a position which reflects a rather dim. but perhaps realistic \iew of
its own enforcement processes. Cable Television Report and Order at 3264.
On reconsideration. however. the Commission indicated that it would wahc thl: onl:
year moratorium where it had changed it~ original list of viewable station~. Reconsider·
ation Opinion at 13855.
At the same time. the Commission added a requirement that notice o( an)' viewabilit)
survey be given to local television and cable television operators. Reconsideration Opinion
at 13856.
36. The phrase is derived from the fact that the problem was first mentioned briefly
in the Second Report and Order. 2 F.C.C.2d 725. 786 n.69 (1966).
37. Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquin·. 15 F.C.C.2d 417.436·37
(1968).
38. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61 (a) (1) (1972).
39. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59 (b).76.61 (b). (c). 76.63 (a) (19i2).
The rules allow unlimited importation of distant educational television signals unl~ a
local educational authority obtains special relief from the Commission. 47 C.F.R. §§
76.59 (c). 76.61 (d) (19i2). This represents a change from the Commission's former fC:Jr
that importation of educational signals would reduce a community's incenth'c to (und
its own educational station. Second Report and Order. 2 F.C.C.2d 725. 761-63 (1966). Thl'
Commission may noW' feel. however. that the emergence of thc Corporation (or Puhlic
Broadcasting has decreased the need for local funding.
40. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61 (b) (2) (1972).
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to get authorized signals. Theoretically, the leapfrogging restrictions arc
designed to prevent cable operators from importing only a few, highly
attractive independent stations;41 but realistically, they give priority, and
another low-visibility subsidy, to UHF independent stations.
Second, and far more importantly, attached to the Letter of Intent's
distant signal regulations are the Broadcaster-Cable Agreement's exclusivity provisions. Thus what the Commission gave in terms of distant
signals it took away in the name of exclusivity. Even though authorized
to import a signal, a cable system may not carry programs on the signal
to which a local broadcaster has exclusive rights.
In the top fifty markets, a cable system may not show a syndicated,
i.e., non-network, program for "one year from the date that program is
first licensed or sold ..." to any station - even if it has not been bought
by a local station.42 A television station therefore has a one year grace
period in which to decide whether to purchase a show. As in the Broadcaster-Cable Agreement, a cable system may not import a program whicll
any local station is showing if the contract between the broadcaster and
program supplier provides for exclusivity.43 The upshot is simply that
cable systems in the fifty largest markets are barred from importing
almost any independent programming in perpetuum - aside from nonsyndicated, locally-produced and thus comparatively valueless shows. The
theory behind the ban is that importation would harm independent
producers, since syndicated programs earn their greatest revenues in the
top fifty markets.44 A combination of limited importation and compulsory
copyright payments, however, would be a more acceptable compromise.
In the fifty next largest markets the exclusivity provisions also follow
the Agreement. Although they do not impose the one year pre-sale ban,
they allow very extemive contractual exclusivity rights. A station may
contract with a program owner to bar syndicated re-runs for up to a Jear
41. The Commission noted that if cable systems imported only from the major
markets "[t]here would then be no general participation by broadcast television stations
in the benefits of cable carriage." It also mentioned the "additional consideration that
carriage of closer stations, because they are usuaIly in the same region and often in the
state, supplies some programming that is more likely to be of interest in the cable com·
munity." Cable Television Report and Order at 3265. The latter position seems somewhat
tenuous, however, since a cable operator's self-interest should dictate that he carry signals
of interest to his subscribers. Therefore redistribution appears to be the paramount func·
tion of the leapfrogging rules.
On reconsideration, however, the Commission made clear that a cable system must
keep the signals which it originally elects to carry; the Commission imposed this require.
ment in order to make distant cable audiences "a more saleable commOdity." Reconsider·
ation Opinion at 13850.
42. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151 (a) (1972). Compare Broadcaster·Cable Agreement.
43. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151 (b) (1972). Compare Broadcaster·Cable Agreement.
44. Cable Television Report and Order at 3267.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

COMMUNICATIONS LAW

585

and to prohibit new syndicated series programs, non-series programs, and
feature films for up to two years.45 As a result, cable systems in me lower
major markets must search for programs which have run more man one
or two years - a rather meager diet for a growing industry.
The exclusivity provisions make perfect sense in terms of Cree enterprise reasoning, since they apply only where a station has contracted for
exclusivity "both over-the-air and by cable."41l Arguably, cable !>)'Stems
could pay a program supplier to withhold exclusivity from a local station,
but pragmatically, they will not be able to afford such payments within
the foreseeable future. Although a few cable operators boast about outbidding broadcasters,41 cable systems will not generate the nec~'
revenue until they attract more subscribers - thus creating a situation
analogous to the as yet unresolved chicken and egg proposition:l /:>
The only bright spots in the exclusivity provisions are me grandfather clause, the temporary abandonment of the sports blackoul rule,
and the notification procedure. First, the grandfather clause allows a
system to continue importing any signals carried as of the effecth'e date
of the rules. Moreover, any other system within me same community will
receive the same rights, whenever it begins operation.4t1 Although apparently designed to equalize competitive disadvantages,GO this rule ha!>
the beneficial side effect of making the exclusivity provisions inapplicable
in many areas. Since the rules' effective date is after meir promulgation
date, however, they also may have promoted races to begin distant signal
importation.:>! Second, the Commission did not adopt the Letter of
Intent's proposed ban on importation of locally blacked-out sports
45. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151 (b) (1972). Compare Broadcaster·Cable Agreement. The SC\'erity of the restrictions in the lower fifty major markets is especially anomalous in light o(
the Commission's own recognition that copyright owners earn mast of their revenues in
the top fifty markets. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151 (b) (1972). In this respect, the rules represent a minor improvement over the Broadcaster·Cable Agreement, since the latter required ani)' "contractual exclusivity."
47. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Pou.'er 0/ the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Conl/". 011 Regulatioll of COII/llllmit)· .ofnterma Teln'/,
sion Systems, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55·56 (1969) (Testimony of Irving Kahn. President,
Teleprompter Corp.).
48. For a view contrary to the Commission's on the subject of cxclushit)', see SLO.""
COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: TilE T£LE\'lSION OF ADUSD.""O:
52·54 (1971), which recommended that very stringent Iimit:uions be placed on exclllsivit}
provisions.
49. 47 C.F.R. § 76.159 (1972) provides that the exclusivity provisions do not apply
to "any signal that was carried prior to March 31. 1972, or that any other cable system in
the same community was carrying p'rior to March 31. 1972."
50. Cable Teleyision Report and Order at 3268.
51. This problem appears to have been mitigated, howe\'er, by the (act that new im·
portation of distant signals was still frozen and that the Commission apparentl)· granted
no special waivers before the effective date of the rules.
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programs.:;2 Instead, it spun the question off into a separate, and hopefully lengthy, rule-making proceeding. G3 Since the professional sports'
statutory anti-trust exemption is itself somewhat suspect/>4 expanding it
still further appears inappropriate. Finally, and most importantly, the
exclusivity provisions are operable only if a copyright owner or local
station gives a cable operator actual and detailed notice of the protected
programming.o5 The inherent difficulty of notifying almost three thousand
systems will generate tremendous transactional costs, thus perhaps confining exclusivity claims to the few highly valuable programs where they
rightfully belong.
Like the Agreement, the rules reduce exclusivity for network programs from same-day to simultaneous protection in most cases. GO This is
scant solace, however, for the cable operator. Practically all major markets
have three network stations; thus a duplicate network signal makes a
system only marginally more attractive to subscribers. Moreover, the
reduction in network exclusivity follows a well established pattern; the
shrinking exclusivity rule started out as thirty days, then went to fifteen
and eventually stabilized at one. Gi
The rules are noteworthy, however, not just for what they provide,
but also for what they fail to provide - most notably, protection for
broadcasters in markets below the top one hundred. Smaller market cable
systems may import enough signals to carry three network stations and
one independent station.os Since many smaller markets have only one or
two stations, however, the rules allow a far greater percentage increase in
signals - and accordingly increased audience fragmentation - in a
smaller market than in a major market. G9 Moreover, a recent Rand
52. See Letter of Intent at 1768·69.
53. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 3190 (1972).
54. See Note, Professional Football Telecasts and the Blackout Privilege, 57 CORNELL
L. REv. 297 (1972).
55. 47 C.F.R. § 76.93 (a) (1972).
56. 47 C.F.R. § 76.93 (a) (1972). The Rocky Mountain broadcasters, however, were
able to win their battle for same-day nonduplication, note 30 supra, when the Commission, on reconsideration, gave them the same-day rule. Reconsideration Opinion at 13852.
The rules provide for increased nonduplication protection upon the filing of a
special petition in the problematic situation created when a cable system in one time zone
carries programs before a local station in another time zone. 47 C.F.R. § 76.93 (b) (1972).
The rules do not prevent a cable system from carrying. a network program before a local
station, however, if the station delays its broadcast. This seems only reasonable, since a
station's change in scheduling is a conscious election and is most likely where smaller
market stations have multiple affiliations.
Also, on reconsideration, the Commission indicated that "simultaneous" meant "5 or
10 minutes." Reconsideration Opinion at 13852.
57. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 721-30 (1965): Cable Television Report and Order at 3266.
58. 47 C.F.R. § 76.59 (b) (1972).
59. For example, in a market with only two stations the rules would result in a one
hundred percent increase in the number of available signals. In a market like New York
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Corporation study concluded that cable poses its only real threat to
broadcasting in precisely these markets. GO Smaller market broadcasten.
apparently wield enough clout to win e.xtra carriage, but not distant
signal protection.Gl
Similarly, cable systems outside of any television market may import
an unlimited number of distant signals.G:! Aside from potentially injuring
broadcasters with marginal audiences in such are.'lS, this provision would
reverse the Commission's traditional allocation of broadcast signals in
proportion to population size.G3
This pattern of severe restrictions on distant signal importation
seems to lack a firm policy basis. The Commission gave no rationale for
its distant signal formula, but merely concluded that the formula loomehow would allow cable to develop without injuring broadcasting.t.I
Perhaps by way of understatement, the Commission noted that there was
"no consensus" or "sure barometer" as to cable's impact on broadcasting.G5 To a very real extent, the distant signal controversy has become
a war of statistics. The broadcasters trot out their e.xperts to show extreme
cable impact; the cable interests bring forth tlleir e.xperts to demonstrate
the exact opposite.66 The only up-to-date independent stud)" however,
indicated that cable hurt VHF stations slightly and aided UHF loL'ltions
City, on the other hand, the greatest pOSsible increase would be on UtC order of twenty
percent. See also Comment, Federal and State RegulatiOIl 0/ Cabll' Tt'll'l'isiol/: .-III .-Irlal,'.
sis of the New FCC Rules, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1151, 1175.
60. R. PARK, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH 0:-; TELE\'ISIO:-; BRo.-\DCASTL,\c
68·70 (Rand Corp. 1970). The Commission did not accept Dr. Park's conclusions fully,
but seemed to grant them some validity. See Cable Telc\'ision Rcport and Ordcr at 3261.
Park's conclusions might be a bit pessimistic at worst, howcvcr, since hc based his Cllcu·
lations on the public dividend plan's fOllr distant signals (Sl'e notc 18 ~IlPra and accol11'
panying text), rather than on the mum morc limited importation allowld by uu: new
rules.
61. See note 30 supra.
62. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57 (b) (1972).
63. See, e.g., Sixth Report and Ordcr, 17 Fed. Reg. 39M, 3912 (1952), in whim the
Commission assigned telcvision frequencies on thc basis of population.
64. The Commission just noted that "[i)n so regulating distant signal cmiage, we
hope to give cable impetus to develop in the larger markcts without creating an unaccept.
able risk of adverse impact on local television broadClSt service." Cahlc Tclc\ision Re·
port and Order at 3260. This language largely ec1toed thc Commission's prior rationale
in the Letter ofIntent at 1761.
65. Cable Television Report and Order at 3261.
66. The opening round was a study done for the Commission in 1965, which found
that cable was not a threat to broadClSting. M. SEIDEN, AN ECO:-;OMtc ANAL\'SlS OF CO~I
~mNITY .ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TElE\'ISION BROADC.\STING INDI'STlW (196:i).
The National Association of Broadcasters immcdiately fired back with its own stud)',
which to no one's surprise found that cable had a serious impact on broadClSting. Fisher
8: Ferrall, Communit)' Antenna Television Systems and Local Television Station Audiel/ces,80 Q.J. ECON. 227 (1966). More rccently, another broadcastcrs' analysis undertook
to impeac1t Dr. Park's findings, supra note 60, and documcnt substantial Clblc impacL L.
FISCHMAN, EVALUATION OF FCC At:GUST 5, 1971 DIST.'NT,SIG:-;AL PROPOSALS FOR CABLE TELE·
VISION IN TERMS OF THEIR IMPACf ON OVER-THE·AIR BROADCASTING (Report by Economic
Associates, Inc., at the request of Covington 8: Burling 19i1).
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significantly. a; As a result, the basis for the rules appears to be rather
tenuous and arguably nonexistent. The Commission made a political
rather than a principled decision; it attempted to fashion rules which
would sati&fy both cable and broadcasting interests.
But if the distant signal limitations are questionable. the exclusivity
provisions amount to regulatory overkill. The Commission attempted to
rationalize their severity by arguing that the lack of distant signals would
force cable to develop alternative communications services for attracting
subscribers. 6s Although cable's future in the major markets probably does
lie with nonbroadcast services,69 this line of reasoning seems somewhat
post hoc propter hoc; the Commission could have reached the same goal
by an outright ban on importation, rather than by its unwieldy exclusivi·
ty rules.
Reduced to its bare bones, the distant signal controversy is purely
and simply an issue of economic protectionism.70 Cable systems presently
do have a certain unfair competitive edge, since they need not pay for
their programming. This situation will not last very long, however, since
the exclusivity provisions cannot be implemented without new copyright
legislation, as the Commission is the first to recognize. 71 If the future
copyright statute resembles past bills, it will give cable systems a com·
pulsory - though probably costly - license for distant signals. 72 Cable
systems thus will be in the same competitive posture as broadcasters,
except that their payments will be fixed by law rather than negotiation.
If cable's license fees are in line with broadcasters', as is likely, cable
systems will have merely a rather technical advantage. The only justifica.
tion for restricting importation of distant signals, then, would be some
social value in preserving broadcast television. Cable's capacity and
flexibility, however, render this value arguable at best and hypocritical
at worst.
67. PARK,supra note 50, at 71, 74, 77.
68. Cable Television Report and Order at 3260.
69. See also R. PARK, PROSPECfS FOR CABLE IN THE 100 LARGEST TELEVISION MARKETS
27-31 (Rand Corp. 1971). In this study, Dr. Park found that price, service and income wefe
far more relevant than carriage of distant signals to cable penetration.
70. As Commissioner Nicholas Johnson noted, "[t]he question is only how much
protectionism is warranted and necessary at a time when no station has yet gone off the air
because of cable." Cable Television Report and Order, ~4 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 1591 (1972)
Gohnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
71. Cable Television Report and Order at 3261. In announcing the issuance of the
rules, Chairman Burch noted that without copyright legislation "our problem is acute."
BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 1972, at 18.
72. Under S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § III (c) (I) (B) (1969), cable systems would
have had a compulsory license for all local signals and for as many distant signals as the
Commission authorized. For an analysis of the controversy over copyright legislation,
see Botein, supra note 4, at 840-43.
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III
ACCESS

To

GRL"JD: CABLE USE OF NON-BROADCAST SIGNALS

De!>pite its discussion of distant signals as an "incentive" for cable
development,7a the Commission is relying less on a "carrot" than on a
"stick." approach to insure that cable produces its promised new services
- such as subscription television, shopping by cable, instant poll!', home
safety monitoring systems, and other two-way modes of communication.
The Commission has retained its requirement that cable systems with
more than 3,500 subscribers originate programming "to a significant
extent as a local outlet,"N which the Supreme Court recently upheld.1:;
More importantly, the Commission at last has taken some tentative, albeit
ill-defined, steps towards implementing a right of access to cable tele\'ision.7 G The Commission's new interest in access may be, of course, just a
response to new demands for public access to the mass media - as
reflected most dramatically in the District of Columbia Circuit's hesitant
recognition of a first amendment right of access to tele\'ision.11 The Commission thus might be attempting to take the heat off broadcasting b),
transferring it to cable.
The Commission's most important step towards implementing access
may be in providing the necessary technological hardware. The rules
require that all major market cable systems have as many channels COJ'
nonbroadcast as for broadcast uses, Witll a minimum capacity of twenty
73. Cable Television Report and Order at 3260.
74. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1972).
75. See notes 126-131 infra and accompan}ing text.
76. For a more complete discussion of the problems whidl access raises, see Botcin,
Access to Cable Television, 57 CoRNELL L REv.419 (1972).
77. In Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971), the court held that television stations' intimate invoh'ement with the Cederal go\"·
ernment imbued them with state action and that a "fiat ban on editorial ad\Oertising" thus
violated the first amendment. The court did not establish a full right of access, howe\'er,
and gave no indication of how far its holding extended.
In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit has been active in c."'panding the right
to reply time under the fairness doctrine and in facilitating dlillenges to licen.se reo
newals. In Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), it held Ulat product
commercials could violate the fairness doctrine, and in Citizens Communications Center v.
FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 19i1), it invalidated the Commission's lenient license
renewal standard.
These are, of course, just the visible signs of the new trend Cor public access. Brrod·
casters today find themselves under increasing pressure to Collow the wishes of their
communities. And when BToadcasting-the mouthpiece of the broadcaster establishment
-ran a two-part series on various aspects of the access controversy, it signaled that the
new demands had left their mark. Zeidenburg, The Struggle Over BToadcast Access.
BROADCASTING, Sept. 20,1971, at 32; id., Sept. 27,1971, at 24.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

590

1971/72 ANNUAL

~URVEY

OF AMERICAN LAW

channels.7S Though commendably generous, this approach may place too
much emphasis on number of broadcast signals rather than on actual
local needs. 79 It might be more appropriate, although more complicated,
to use a population standard in determining channel capacity - as the
Commission has attempted to do in allocating broadcast licenses. Despite
this difficulty, the channel capacity requirement is a major de\'elopment
in implementing access. Less than ten percent of existing cable systems
have more than twelve channels,so and "retrofitting" a system for increased capacity is almost prohibitively expensive.s1 As a result, cable
systems should be forced to develop the necessary channel capacity at
the outset.
As a corollary to the channel capacity requirement, the rules provide
that all major market cable systems must build in at least some capability
for two-way communications between subscribers and the system. The
Commission has left this requirement deliberately vague,82 however, and
probably is concerned only that operators lay cable which can accomodate
future two-way communications. Although far short of pie in the sky, this
seems economically reasonable at the present time. Two-way communication is far more expensive than originally estimated. For example, even a
simple non-voice subscriber response system - suitable for subscription
television or shopping by cable - doubles the cost of a cable system.S3
Though providing the hardware for access, the Commission has
failed to create a regulatory system. Its comment that "[t]hese access rules
constitute not a complete body of detailed regulations but a basic framework ... "S4 goes far by way of understatement. To be sure, the rules do
require all major market cable systems to provide a free "public access,"
"education access," and "local government access" channe1.8G They also
78. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (1), (2) (1972).
79. For example, it would require a San Francisco cable system to have almost as
many nonbroadcast channels as a New York City cable system, even though the forlller
market is only one fourth the size of the latter.
80. 41 TELEVISION FACTBOOK: SERVICES VOLUME 82·a (1971).
81. See 'V. BAER, INTERACTIVE TELEVISION: PROSPECTS FOR Two-'VAY SERVICES ON
CABLE 76-77 (Rand Corp. 1971).
82. The rules call for "technical capacity for non-voice return communications," 4'1
C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (3) (1972), but the Report talks in terms of "the potential or eventually
providing return communications ..." Cable Television Report and Order at 32'10. At the
same time, the Commission may be indirectly attempting to encourage development of
two-way services through its selection of required technical standards. E.g., 47 C.F.R. §
76.605 (2) (1972) which allows a wider frequency deviation for systems with converters,
which are the first and most basic piece of subscriber terminal hardware for two-way
communications.
83. BAER, supra note 81, at 66.
84. Cable Television Report and Order at 3269.
85. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (4) to (6) (19'12).
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clear up an ambiguity in the Letter of IntentS6 by providing that a cable
system "shall" offer to lease all unused channel capacity.s1
Unfortunately, however, the rules do not guarantee access to either
free or leased channels. First, they do not define which channel a potential
user is entitled to. Thus the three free cllannels may overlap in their
scope; a local school board conceivably could qualify as a public acc~
user, an educational user, or a local governmental user. More import.mtl)"
the Commission has delegated to cable operators the power to choose
users for the channels. The rules do not establish standards, but instead
require only that systems "shall establish rules requiring first-come non·
discriminatory access."S8 Thus, a cable operator presumably mny make
long·term and large.scale commitments for both free and leased chan neb,
leaving many potential users out in the cold. Although apparently aware
of this possibility, the Commission did little to prevent it.w In theory,
the access problem should be alleviated by the requirement - pre\'iously
known as "N + 1"90 - that a cable system add a new channel whenever
all nonbroadcast channels "are in use during 80 percent of the weekdays
(Monday.Friday) for 80 percent of the time during any consecutive
3·hour period for 6 consecutive weeks .... "01 Pragmatically, however, tllis
requirement probably will be of little help. The rules im'ite cable
operators to stay under the magic figure, which should be easy enough
through a variety of overt and covert means. Moreover, retrofitting is so
expensive that the Commission is unlikely to require expansion e.xcept
by activation of an existing channel.
Potential access users require not only program time but also produc.
tion facilities; a medium without a message is useless.92 The extent of a
86. The Letter of Intent had provided that operators "may" lease cxce!s channel
capacity, but then went on to require that all leasing be on a "first·come, first-SCf\'ed
nondiscriminatory basis." Letter of Intent at 1774-75.
87. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (7) (1972).
88. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (II) (i), (iii) (1972). Moreo\'er, the Commission has effectively tied local governments' hands by providing that "no local entity shall prescribe any
other rules concerning the number or manner of operation of access dlanncls" without
Commission approval. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (II) (iv) (1972). This apparentl), bars Cran·
mise authorities from imposing requirements more stringent, as well as more lenient, than
the Commission's. Cable Television Report and Order at 3271.
89. The rules exert some effort toward rectif}ing this problem b)' requiring that
"[o]n at least one of the leased channels, priority shall be gi\'en to part.time users." 47
C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (7) (1972). The rule is sufficiently vague to allow only token compliance, however, and by its terms does not apply to the three designated free channels.
90. Letter ofIntent at 1773.
91. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (8) (1972). It should be noted, however, that the rule ma)'
require a cable operator to make available only a leased channel when all Cree channels
are occupied, since it mandates a channel "for any or all of the abo\'e·described purposes."
ld.
92. For a proposal of the type of facilities a cable system should make a\'3i1able to
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cable system's obligation to provide production facilities, however, is
unclear. The rules opt for tokenism by requiring only that a cable
operator maintain free equipment for five minute live presentations on
the public access channel, thus leaving the operator free to charge what·
ever the market will bear for any additional production.1I3
In designing the access provisions, the Commission specifically reo
jected proposals that cable be regulated as a common carrier.04 Although
attractive, the common carrier approach is presently infeasible. First, no
one yet has devised a workable and equitable scheme for the allocation
of channels which have unquantifiable but different values.O G Second,
cable is still an infant industry which requires massive infusions of
venture capital; investors will be loathe to risk their money, however, if
cable promises only a conventional public utility rate of return.o,; But
although it rejected the common carrier approach, the CommissiolJ took
at least a tentative step towards divorcing ownership from control; the
rules provide that cable systems "shall exercise no control over program
content" on either free or leased channels.97 The only fly in this first
amendment ointment is the Commission's accompanying requirement
that cable systems exclude obscenity, lotteries, etc.os This latter mandate
presumably requires previewing and thus allows the cable operator to
pass prior judgment on all programming. Since the rules make the cable
operator's decision highly discretionary, a flat ban on any interference
with programming would be more appropriate.
Many of the problems with access in general and censorship in
particular could have been mitigated by more stringent restrictions on
cable ownership by other media and by multiple cable system operators.!)O
Unfortunately, the Commission took absolutely no action on concentra·
tion of control, but rather just retained its weak prohibition of cable
ownership by local television stations, national networks, and telephone
com panies. loo
potential users, see Note, Common Carrier CATV: Problems and Proposals, 37 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 533, 540-42 (1971).
93. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (10) (ii) (1972). This provision is inadequate for the simple
reason that few things worth saying can be said in less than five minutes of total produc.
tion-as distinguished from viewing-time.
94. Cable Television Report and Order at 3272.
95. See Note, supra note 92, at 533·34.
96. See JONES, supra note 4, at 122·23, 183; Comment, suprlt note 59, at 1187·88.
97. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (9) (1972). The rule specifically allows, however, "appro.
priate steps to insure compliance" with the requirement of excluding certain prohibited
types of programming. [d. See note 98 infra.
98. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (11) (1972).
99. See Botein, supra note 76, at 432·3B.
100. 47 C.F.R § 76.501 (1972) was taken verbatim from 47 C.F.R. § 74.1131 (1971).
In its Notice of Proposed Rule Making and of Inquiry, 35 Fed. Reg. 11.042, 11.043 (1970),
the Commission proposed two alternative bans on multiple ownership, one based on
geography, the other on total number of subscribers. Neither one was very satisfactory,
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IV
BOXES WITHIN BOXES: FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATORY
RELATIONSHIPS

Unlike broadcast television, cable television traditionally has been
regulated by all three levels of government, partially because it has some
inherently local characteristics and partially because the Commission
fai\ed to act for so long. The Commission has been slow to coordinate its
regulation with states and cities and as recently as 1970 announced that
it was "without any overall plan as to the Federal-local relationship."JOJ
Thus cable regulation has become a two- and sometimes three-tiered
bureaucratic nightmare, replete with conflicting policies. The Cable
Television Report and Order does not restructure intergovenrmental
relationships, however, but merely imposes some very general resttictions
- analogous to the Letter of Intent's "guidelines"lo2 - on state and
local agencies. The Commission obviously was interested not just in
setting outer limits on corruption-ridden local franchise procccdings,lOJ
but also in scaring potential state agencies out of the field.
Perhaps most significant is the requirement that a cable system "have
a franchise or other appropriate authorization ... :'lOt Though still
somewhat vague, this may overrule the state court cases which ha\'c held
that municipalities lacked the power to franchise cable systcms.10:; In
addition, the rules marginally increase citizen participation by requiring
a "public proceeding affording due process" in the franchising and ratemaking processes. 106 Though a definite improvement over thc LCltcr of
(see Botein, supra note 4, at 838·39), but the proposals at least indielloo somc tJlOught on
the subject.
101. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 11.044 (1970).
102. Letter of Intent at 1780·83.
103. See note 4 supra.
104. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (1972). The rulc is somcwhat ambiguous, howC\·cr. AI·
though it speaks of "a franchisc or other appropriate authorization" at the beginning, it
later talks in terms of the "franchising authority" and the "frandlisc"-an open imitation to construe it as appliClble only to franchised systems. Moreovcr, in passing on peti.
tions for reconsideration the Commission appeared ready to wah'c thc requirement of a
local authorization where a 10ClI jurisdictional void existed. Thc Commi5.~ion indielloo
that it would grant special certifiCltes of compliance whcre no 10eJl £randlising or olllCf
authorizing body was in existence; thus sccmingly abolishing its requirement of a fran·
chise. Reconsideration Opinion at 13863.
The regulations are noteworthy for the fact that thcy impose requirements on cable
systems, not directly on franchising authoritics. [d. As a result, a local gO\'crnment is
theoretically free to disregard the Commission's standards-at tJle cost of preventing its
franchisee from carrying broadClSt television signals. This somcwhat circuitous means of
regulating the franchise process is prcsumably a product of the Commission's unvoiced.
though legitimate, doubts about its power to pre·empt local autlJorities.
105. For a discussion of these state C1Ses, see Botein. supra notc 4, at 820·21.
106. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (I) (1972).

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

594

1971/72 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

Intent's "suggestion" concerning hearings,107 the vagueness of the rule
obviously allows minimal compliance. lOS
Though the rules set a maximum initial franchise length of fifteen
years, they require that renewals be only of "reasonable duration."loo Municipalities thus still can lock themselves into long-term commitments,
similar to New York City's twenty-year franchises. A franchise longer than
ten years is unnecessary to attract venture capital, however, since most
cable systems are fully amortized in seven or eight years. 110 Moreover,
lengthy franchise terms invite obsolescence in equipment and trafficking in
franchises.
The rules also make some faint gestures in the direction of consumer
protection. First, they require local franchising authorities to pass on
cable systems' rates, therefore giving citizens at least a foot in the door,ll1
The Commission may intend local governments to set rates only for the
carriage of broadcast signals and not for the provision of new communications services.1l2 Although seemingly unfair to subscribers, cable
systems must be allowed to charge high - perhaps even exorbitantinitial rates for new services in order to attract the requisite venture
capital. Second, the rules require franchises to include procedures for
handling subscribers' complaints,11a a provision borrowed from several
proposed state statutes. 114 These rules are couched in exceedingly general
terms, but nevertheless give subscribers minimal leverage. Third, the rules
provide that cable systems must wire a "substantial percentage"llG suggested to be twenty percent116 - of their franchise areas annually, thus
reducing systems' ability to "creamskim" the more affluent parts of their
communities.
Finally, the rules limit local franchise fees to three percent of n
system's gross receipts, unless the Commission approves a higher
107. Letter of Intent at 1780.
108. Moreover, public hearings may be of little real value. The closest analogy to
such proceedings is the Commission's own comparative licensing procedure, which has
been fraught with inconsistency and undue influence. R.A. ANTHONY, COlllPARATIVE
BBOADCAST LICENSING PROCEEDINGS: MAKING THEM SIMPLER AND MORE ODJECTIVE 31-42
(1971).
109. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (3) (1972); Reconsideration Opinion at 13862.
1l0. THE CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBUC ISSUES, supra note 4. at 56.
lll. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (4) (1972).
112. By its terms, tlIe rule applies only to "installation of equipment and regular
subscriber services," 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (4) (1972). and tlIe Commission talked solely in
terms of "services regularly furnished to all subscribers." Cable Television Report and
Order at 3276.
113. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (5) (1972).
114. See, e.g., BETrER BROADCASTING COUNCIL, A MODEL ORDINANCE FOR CADLE TELEVISiON FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO § 2.50 (1970); N.Y. Assy. Int. No. 6700-A § 671 (7) (1970).
115. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (2) (1972). The rule also requires a cable operator to "ac·
co~plish ~!gnificant construction witlIin one (1) year after receiving Commission certifi·
catIOn .... Id.
116. Cable Television Report and Order at 3276.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

COMMUNICATIONS LAW

595

amount.1l7 This probably represents a compromise between the two
percent previously proposed by the Commission118 and the five percent
charged by most cities, including New York.l19 Even the three percent
figure far exceeds actual regulatory expenses,1!!o and thus constitutes a
windfall for financially-starved municipalities - at the cost of an indirect
and regressive tax on cable subscribers.
V
THE LEGALITY OF THE RULES: MIDWEST BY SOUTHWESTERN

The rules may be vulnerable on two grounds. First, the Commbsion's
failure to issue the exclusivity provisions as proposed rules may violate
the Administrative Procedure Act,l21 Second, the Commission may lack
the statutory power to impose the access and franchise provisions,
The first argument appears tenuous. Notice of the exclusivity provisions was never published in the Federal Register. but few "person~
subject thereto" could have escaped "actual notice,"!!!!! Every trade
magazine greeted the Broadcaster-Cable Agreement with banner headlines and described its provisions in detail. Thus, finding anyone in the
field who did not know of the Agreement probably would be impossible,
Until very recently the jurisdictional argument would have had some
validity. Though the Commission's general jurisdiction over cable has
long been accepted, its precise e.xtent never has been clear, Thus in
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co,,1!!3 the Supreme Court upheld
the Commission's jurisdiction but declined to pass upon the validity or
the 1966 regulations. Instead, it somewhat Delphically held thut "the
authority which we recognize today ... is restricted to that reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
117. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (b) (1972).
118. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,044, 11,045 (1970),
119. New York City Bd. of Estimate, Proposed Form of Contract with Sterling In·
formation Services, Ltd. § 7 (a) (1970). See JONES, supra note 4, at 134-35.
120. As the Commission noted, its own cable regulatory fees are only about one half
of one percent of a cable system's gross receipts. Cable Tele\'ision Report and Order at
3277.
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500·76 (1970).
122. 5 U.s.C. § 553 (b) (1970) provides, in pertinent part: "General notice of pro·
posed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject
thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof
in accordance with law. . . ." For an analysis of the case law interpreting the "actual
notice" requirement, see K. C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATI\'E LAw TREATISE § 6.10, at 395·97
(1959).
Moreover, the rules might fall within the provisions of 5 U.s.C. § 553 (b) (B) (1970),
which exempts the requirement of notice "where the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnec=ry, or contrary to tlle
public interest." For language within the report which might be deemed to {all under
this exemption, see Cable Television Report and Order at 3277.
123. 392 U.s. 157 (1968).
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responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."121 This less
than precise language touched off a still raging debate over the meaning
of "reasonably ancillary."l2G
The Supreme Court recently dampened the controversy somewhat in
United States v. Midwest Video Corp.p6 which upheld the origination
requirement. l21 In the process, however, the Court split 4-1-4 and was
forced to hold that "reasonably ancillary" meant far more than Southwestern had indicated.
The plurality's test was whether the regulations fulfilled "objectives
for which the Commission's regulatory power over CATV might properly
be exercised."l28 This standard's breadth and novelty are reflected in the
plurality's almost casual comment that "the Commission's legitimate
concern in the regulation of CATV is not limited to controlling the
competitive impact CATV may have on broadcast services."12!l Indeed,
the plurality found "no sensible distinction" between protection of
broadcasting and development of cablel30 - a far cry from Southwestern's reasoning. l3l In fact if not in theory, the plurality abandoned
the Southwestern definition of "reasonably ancillary." Indeed, the plurality's emphasis on proper "objectives" indicates that "reasonably ancillary"
now may be equivalent to the Communications Act's "public interest"
standard for regulation of broadcasters.l32
124. Id. at 178.
125. Botein, supra note 76, at 456. Realistically, of course, the Communications Act
grants the Commission no authority over cable at all. Cable is obviously neither a common
carrier under Title II of the Act nor a broadcaster under Title III of the Act. Indeed,
even the Commission takes the position that cable is a somewhat mystical "hybrid" of the
two. Cable Television Report and Order at 3277. Cable thus has been jammed Into some
interstice between Titles II and III of the Act. And the new rulea may exacerbate this
doctrinally difficult situation by requiring cable systems to file applications for initial
"certificates of compliance" as well as annual financial and programming reports-a
procedure which looks suspiciously like either licensing or tariffing. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.II,
76.13 (a) (2) (1972). The certificate of compliance device appears to stem from some Com·
mission officials' desire to make cable operators more secure by "giving them something
to hang on the wall."
126. 40 U.S.L.W. 4626 (1972).
127. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
128. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4630.
129. Id. at 4631 (emphasis added).
130. [d.
131. Thus Chief Justice Burger, who supplied the deciding vote, felt compelled to
state in his concurring opinion that "candor requires acknowledgment, for me at least,
that the Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the open· ended and per·
vasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the Commission and the courts." Id.
at 4634. The Chief Justice's approach was perhaps the most intellectually honest. Indeed,
he might well have gone with the dissent, had he not worked as a circuit court judge
towards promoting access to the mass media. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.1966).
132. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1970).
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As a result of Midwest Video, the access and franchise l33 pro\isions'
survival appears assured. The access provisions are just a reasonable
extension of the origination requirement and serve the same regulatory
as well as first amendment interests. l34 Similarly. the franchise requirements are designed to guarantee meaningful local participation in the
cable regulatory process - a goal in which the Midweast Video court
obviously 'was quite interested. l3s Midweast Video thus empowers the
Commission to protect the interest of the public as well as of the broadcasting establishment.
CONCLUSION

Although far from ideal. the new cable television regulations at least
represent a move off dead center. The distant signal regulations remain
protectionist and end the freeze in name only. The access pro\'isiom
reflect more sophistication than in the past. howe\'er. and the franchise
requirements guarantee at least minimal citizen participation. The Cable
Television Report and Order is therefore perhaps most important not
for what it has done. but rather for what it has left undone; it represents
the first. not the final word on cable regulation.
133. Whether the Commission has the power to pre·empt state and local authorities
is less than clear. Federal statutes are supreme over state law, Farmers Educational &:
Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc.. 360 U.s. 525 (1959), but administrath'e regulations
may not be. The Co~ission's uncertainty is indicated by its decision not to impose
franchising standards directly on local governments, but rather on cable systems over
whose use of broadcast signals its jurisdiction is clear. See note 104 supra. But ct. Comment, supra note 59, at 1190·91.
134. Realistically. Midwest Video may have rested as much on first amendment as on
regulatory grounds; the Court obviously was interested in origination's subtle but very
real first amendment aspects. The Court recently and repeatedly has committed i~f to
diversity of programming and access to the mass media. See, e.g., Rosenbloom \'. Metro·
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.s. 367. 390
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sulli·
van, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964). The plurality often noted the origination channel's p0tential uses. 40 U.s.L.W. at 4628 n.8, 4632.
135. Id.
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